Reforming Equalization: Balancing Efficiency, Entitlement and Ownership by Dahlby, Bev
www.policyschool.ca
Volume 7 • Issue 22 • September 2014
REFORMING EQUALIZATION:
BALANCING EFFICIENCY,
ENTITLEMENT AND OWNERSHIP†
Bev Dahlby 
Distinguished Fellow, The School of Public Policy and 
Professor, Department of Economics, University of Calgary
SUMMARY
In this paper, we provide an overview of the equalization grant system in Canada and the issues that have
been raised concerning the reform of the fiscal transfer system. Any reforms to the equalization grant
system have to balance three concerns — “efficiency” effects that arise through federal financing of
transfers, and the incentive effects on provincial fiscal policies, “entitlement” to reasonably comparable
public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation, and “ownership” of resources and
independence of fiscal policies by provincial governments. Five proposals for reform of the equalization
system are discussed. With regard to the inclusion rate for resource revenues in equalization formula, we
argue that the rate should be reduced from 50 per cent to 25 per cent and that ceiling on total equalization
payments should be eliminated. We argue against the proposal to exempt from the calculation of
equalization entitlements that are deposited in provincial sovereign wealth funds because this would not
reduce total equalization entitlements in present value terms, it would be complex to implement if it
extended to all forms of savings by provinces (such as debt reduction), and it would not alter the resource
rich provinces’ incentives to save more of their resource revenues. We argue against a proposal to reduce
CHT and CST to provinces with above average fiscal capacities because this would reduce their incentive
to develop and tax their resources, and it would be counter to the purpose of these block grants, which is
to reduce the vertical fiscal imbalance between the federal and the provincial governments. We review the
Gusen (2012a) proto-type model for incorporating variations in costs and needs in the computation of the
equalization entitlements and argue that this procedure seems feasible and merits further analysis.
† I would like to thank Mel McMillan, David Sewell, and an anonymous referee for their comments on a
draft of this paper. They are not responsible for any of the errors, omissions or opinions expressed in
this paper.
INTRODUCTION
First recommended by the Rowell-Sirois Commission in 1940, federal equalization payments to
reduce the differences in revenue-generating capacity among the provinces were introduced by
the Liberal government of Louis St. Laurent in 1957. Ottawa’s commitment to providing
equalization was later incorporated into the Constitution as part of the patriation process
initiated by Pierre Trudeau. The wording used to enshrine this commitment, however, is
ambiguous, providing little guidance in designing or evaluating a specific equalization program.
According to Section 36(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982:
Parliament and the Government of Canada are committed to the principle of
making equalization payments to ensure that provincial governments have
sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public
services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation.
What are reasonably comparable “levels” of taxation? How are the “levels” of taxation to be
interpreted? How much variation in public services is consistent with “reasonably comparable
levels” of services ― 10 per cent, 20 per cent or 50 per cent variations? What services should
be compared across provinces ― services to individuals, services to business or both? Should
variations in the cost of providing public services across provinces affect equalization
entitlements? Should provincial capital expenditures be treated differently than provincial
expenditures on current services? All of these issues concerning permissible variations in the
standard of service, the applicable range of public services and the measurement of services are
complex and open to a range of interpretations. 
The constitutional obligation to provide equalization grants is deliberately vague because the
issues regarding the appropriate level of equalization are complex and do not admit to simple
solutions. Furthermore, the objective of equalization may conflict with other objectives or
constraints in the Constitution. Any reforms to the equalization grant system would have to
balance concerns about:
• “efficiency” effects that arise through federal financing of transfers, the incentive effects on
provincial fiscal policies and regulations and the consequent re-allocation of labour and
capital within the economy;
• “entitlement” to reasonably comparable public services at reasonably comparable levels of
taxation; and 
• “ownership” of resources and independence of fiscal policies by provincial governments. 
Achieving a fine balance of these goals is not easy. Inevitably, there will be differences in the
emphasis that commentators and government officials place on each. A frank and open
discussion of the objectives, constraints and trade-offs is necessary to understand the competing
points of view on how the equalization system should be structured or reformed.
This paper provides an overview of the equalization grant system in Canada as well as the issues
that have been raised concerning its reform. In the next section of this paper, we summarize
some of the main points from the theoretical frameworks that have been developed to evaluate
equalization transfers. In the following section of this paper, we provide a statistical overview of
the current equalization program, including measures of fiscal capacity and disparities in
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provincial tax rates and expenditures. A subsequent section of this paper is devoted to
examining the prominent reform proposals put forward over the years by commentators and
provincial governments. The paper concludes with a list of recommendations on how the
equalization system can best be reformed.
FRAMEWORKS FOR EVALUATING EQUALIZATION TRANSFERS
It is important to have analytical frameworks or models that provide a rationale for
equalization grants when evaluating the system. The economics literature on intergovernmental
grants is vast and here we will only present a brief summary of the aspects that are most
relevant to the reform of the Canadian fiscal transfer system.1 For our purposes, we will parse
the theoretical literature into models of (a) labour mobility and net fiscal benefits, (b)
horizontal and vertical fiscal imbalances in the marginal cost of public funds and (c) regional
shocks and fiscal insurance. In the final part of this section, we will examine a model used by
Dahlby to evaluate the trade-off between efficiency and fiscal equity.2
Labour Mobility and Net Fiscal Benefits
In their seminal article, “Efficiency And Equalization Payments In A Federal System Of
Government: A Synthesis And Extension Of Recent Results,” Boadway and Flatters provide
the rationale for equalization transfers in a federation based on the inefficient regional
allocation of labour that can arise from a household’s decision of where to live and work. Only
the key aspects of this framework, which has been extended over the years by Boadway and
his co-authors and extensively reviewed elsewhere by Boadway and Tremblay, will be outlined
here.3 The basic assumption of the model is that production is based on a Ricardian technology
with diminishing marginal product of labour owing to a fixed input, such as land or mineral
resources. Labour is mobile between provinces and will be allocated up to the point where the
after-tax wage rates and benefit from provincially provided public services are equalized across
provinces. The equilibrium allocation of labour with costless mobility can be inefficient
because individual workers do not take into account the fiscal externalities they impose, or
provide, to existing residents when they move from one province to another. These fiscal
externalities arise because if the provinces provide pure public goods, the migrant does not add
to the cost of providing the public good in that province, but helps to finance it through the
provincial taxes that he pays. This externality is diminished to the extent that the public
services are impure public goods and in the limit it disappears if the provinces provide quasi-
private goods. This latter case seems to be the most relevant in the Canadian context because
most provincial government spending is on health care, education and social assistance
payments, which can be considered publicly provided private goods. The other source of fiscal 
1 For a comprehensive review of the literature on intergovernmental grants, see Robin Boadway and Anwar Shah, ed.,
Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers (Washington, D.C.:  The World Bank, 2007).
2 Bev Dahlby, “Notes on the Trade-Off between Efficiency and Fiscal Equity in a Federation with Imperfect Labour
Mobility and Economic Rents” (Unpublished, School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, 2014).
3 Robin W. Boadway and Jean-Francois Tremblay, “Reassessment of the Tiebout Model,” Journal of Public Economics
96 (2012): 1063-1078; Robin W. Boadway, “The Theory and Practice of Equalization,” CESifo Economic Studies 50
(2004): 211–254
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3externality arises from provincial variations in the net fiscal benefits that workers can derive in
different provinces because of differences in the source-based tax revenues — economic rents
from provincial ownership or taxes on natural resources and source-based taxes on capital —
and differences in average incomes that give rise to differences in personal income tax bases.4
To the extent that labour is attracted to regions that provide these net fiscal benefits, the
marginal products of labour will not be equalized across provinces and aggregate output will
be reduced compared to an efficient allocation of labour that would equalize the marginal
product of labour across provinces.
Within the context of this model, Boadway and Flatters derive formulas for equalization
transfers that would neutralize the allocative inefficiencies that arise from provincial public
good provision, differences in source-based revenues and differences in personal income tax
bases.5 In addition to the efficiency gains from correcting distortions in the allocation of labour,
Boadway and Flatters stress that an equalization grant system also promotes horizontal equity
in the provision of public services at comparable levels of provincial taxation. They recognize
that pursuing complete horizontal equity in a federation may conflict with the rationale for
fiscal decentralization because of regional variations in economic and social conditions and
preferences for public services. Another important reason for fiscal decentralization is to limit
the concentration of political and fiscal powers of a central government and grant local control
over key resources to local residents. In the author’s view, decentralization reduces social
conflicts that inhibit investment and economic growth and, most important, helps to preserve
political liberties. 
The allocative inefficiencies that the equalization transfers address in the Boadway and Flatters
model arise from labour mobility. While labour is “reasonably mobile” in Canada, it is far from
“perfectly mobile” owing to such factors as the social networks individuals have in their home
provinces, as well as the transportation costs, re-location costs and the risks associated with
moving to an unfamiliar labour market.6 To the extent that these mobility costs inhibit
migration in response to differences in net fiscal benefits provided in different provinces, the
regional misallocation of labour may be limited. Furthermore, housing prices may adjust to
reflect differences in net fiscal benefits. If land in urban areas is relatively inelastic in supply,
the efficiency losses from differences in the fiscal benefits among provinces may be limited.
Other limitations of the Boadway and Flatters model, which will be discussed in more detail
below, are the inadequate consideration given to the federal government in the model, as well
as the insufficient descriptions of how federal transfers are financed and how provincial
governments’ fiscal decisions are affected by the equalization formula. In spite of these
limitations, the Boadway and Flatters framework is still the starting point for most evaluations
of the equalization system in Canada.
4 In “Evaluating the Efficiency and Equity of Federal Fiscal Equalization, David Albouy argues that differences in
residence-based taxes should not be a source of transfers if workers are perfectly mobile across provinces.
However, in Albouy’s model, federal transfers are made to individuals and not to governments and therefore it has
limited relevance for the evaluation of intergovernmental transfers.
5 Boadway (2004, p.230, equation (6)).
6 Kathleen Day and Stanley Winer, Interregional Migration and Public Policy in Canada: an Empirical Study,
Carleton Library Series Vol. 223. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2012); David Amirault,
Daniel de Munnik, and Sarah Miller, “Explaining Canada’s Regional Migration Patterns,” Bank of Canada Review
Spring (2013): 16-28; and Jonathan Bendiner, “Interprovincial Migration Shifts in Canada,” Observation, TD
Economics, June 17, 2013.
Horizontal and Vertical Fiscal Imbalances and the Marginal Cost of Public Funds
Dahlby and Wilson try to provide a rationale for equalization transfers that does not rely on
correcting allocative inefficiencies arising from labour mobility or based on notions of
horizontal equity in the provision of public services and taxes across a federation.7 In keeping
with other models of fiscal federalism, such as Zodrow and Miezkowski,8 Dahlby and Wilson
assume that labour is completely immobile between provinces, but that there are differences in
the size and tax sensitivity of the provincial tax bases. As a result, there are differences in the
marginal cost of public funds for the provincial governments that want to raise a given amount
of tax revenue.9
Drawing on the insights of the optimal taxation literature, the authors posit that the optimal
allocation of taxes and public spending across provinces would equalize the marginal cost of
public funds (MCF) in raising tax revenues and the social marginal benefit from the provision
of public services. As further developed by Dahlby and Wilson,10 equalization grant formulas
can be derived that contain both “needs” and “fiscal capacity” components. 
Two insights are provided by looking at the rationale for equalization in this way. First, a
province’s fiscal capacity is its ability to raise revenues at a relatively low MCF, which in turn,
depends on the tax rates, the tax sensitivity of the tax bases and the interactions among the
province’s tax bases. This implies that an accurate measure of a province’s fiscal capacity
depends not only on the size of its tax base (usually measured in per capita terms) but also on
the tax sensitivity of that base and its complementarity or substitutability with others. For
example, the provincial corporate income tax base is much more tax sensitive than the
provincial sales tax base as capital flows are very sensitive to provincial and international tax
differences.11 Sales tax bases, while affected by cross-border shopping and sales tax evasion,
are less tax sensitive than corporate income tax bases. 
7 Bev Dahlby and Leonard Wilson, “Fiscal Capacity, Tax Effort, and Optimal Equalization Grants,” Canadian Journal
of Economics 27, no. 3 (1994): 657-672. and see also Bev Dahlby “An Optimal Taxation Approach to
Intergovernmental Grants.” Working paper 6, Department of Economics, University of Alberta, 2009.
8 George Zodrow and Peter Mieszkowski, “Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public
Goods,” Journal of Urban Economics 19 (1986): 356-370.
9 The loss incurred by the private sector when the federal government raises an additional dollar of revenue through a
tax rate increase generally exceeds a dollar because of the reallocation of resources in the economy to less productive
uses as individuals and firms respond to the changes in the after-tax returns caused by the tax rate increase.  The
marginal cost of public funds, MCF, is a measure of the cost of raising an additional dollar of tax revenue. For a
formal analysis of the MCF, see Bev Dahlby The Marginal Cost of Public Funds: Theory and Applications
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008).  For a more intuitive explanation of the use of the MCF in cost-benefit analysis
and the evaluation of tax reform proposals, see Bev Dahlby and Ergete Ferede, “The Effects of Tax Rate Changes on
Tax Bases and the Marginal Cost of Public Funds for Canadian Provincial Governments,” International Tax and
Public Finance 19 (2012): 844–883.
10 Dahlby and Leonard Wilson, “Fiscal Capacity,” 664, equation 8.
11 In Dahlby and Ferede’s “The Effects of Tax Rate Changes on Tax Bases and the Marginal Cost of Public Funds for
Canadian Provincial Governments,” the greater tax sensitivity of the provincial corporate income tax bases compared
to the sales tax bases is reflected in the much higher MCFs for corporate income tax than for provincial sales taxes.
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Dahlby and Wilson show that the Representative Tax System (RTS) formula for equalization
transfers, which is the basis for calculating equalization payments in Canada, can only be
derived from their “optimal equalization” formula if all of the tax bases in the formula exhibit
the same degree of tax sensitivity (which, as the preceding discussion indicates, is highly
unlikely). They view the RTS system for calculating equalization grants as an approximation to
the optimal equalization transfers in the absence of accurate estimates of the tax sensitivities of
the tax bases.12
In addition to this insight concerning how fiscal capacity should be defined and measured,
viewing equalization grants through the lens of the optimal taxation literature provides a way
of defining the slippery concept of fiscal imbalance. As discussed at greater length by the
author elsewhere,13 a horizontal fiscal imbalance in a federation can be defined as occurring
when the social marginal cost of public funds varies across provinces and a vertical fiscal
imbalance occurs when the social marginal cost of public funds varies across levels of
government. Defining horizontal and vertical fiscal imbalances in this way integrates these
notions with the normative theory of optimal taxation and provides a basis for evaluating fiscal
transfers between levels of government. In particular, it implies that there will be a vertical
fiscal gap in most federations (i.e., the central government will raise more tax revenues than it
needs to fund its own expenditures and that it will transfer revenues to provincial
governments). This fiscal gap is needed to equalize, or at least reduce the difference, in the
marginal cost of public funds between the federal government and the provincial governments.
The underlying rationale for such transfers is that tax bases are generally more sensitive at the
provincial level than they are at the federal level owing to the fact it is easier to shift activity
across provincial boundaries in response to a tax rate increase than it is across international
boundaries. In this sense, a federation that has a vertical fiscal balance will generally be one in
which there is a positive fiscal gap (i.e., subnational governments will spend more than they
raise in own-source tax revenues and the difference will be financed by transfers from the
central government). 
While providing some insights into the rationale for fiscal transfers in a federation, the optimal
taxation approach has practical limitations because of our limited knowledge of the parameters
that reflect tax sensitivities of tax bases. Also, the models developed by Dahlby and Wilson14
ignore the incentive effects that would be created by the transfer formula and the interactions
between the federal and provincial governments’ tax policies given that both levels of
government impose taxes on the same personal, corporate, sales and excise tax bases.
12 For estimates of the tax sensitivities of the provincial personal income, corporate income and sales tax bases, see
Dahlby and Ferede, “The Effects of Tax Rate Changes,” 844–883.
13 Bev Dahlby “An Optimal Taxation Approach to Intergovernmental Grants.” Working paper 6, Department of
Economics, University of Alberta, 2009. Dahlby, The Marginal Cost of Public Funds, chapter 9.
14 Bev Dahlby, “An Optimal Taxation Approach to Intergovernmental Grants” (Working paper 6, Department of
Economics, University of Alberta, 2009).
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Regional Shocks and Fiscal Insurance
Providing provinces with insurance against adverse fiscal shocks has never been the principal
motivation for the equalization program. Indeed, a program that has provided funds to the
Maritime provinces and Quebec every year since its inception over 50 years ago can hardly be
classified as an insurance scheme. Other provinces, however, such as Saskatchewan and British
Columbia have cycled in and out of the program. For the last few years, Ontario has become a
recipient while Newfoundland is no longer a recipient. Thus eligibility for equalization does
depend on the positive and negative shocks to the provincial economies. 
Using a framework that is similar to that of Dahlby and Wilson, Boadway and Tremblay
develop a model of an optimal equalization program in which labour is completely immobile
between provinces and the provincial and federal governments use distortionary taxes to raise
revenues.15 The Boadway and Tremblay model contains a vertical fiscal externality owing to
the fact that the federal and provincial governments both levy taxes on the same base and
provincial tax bases are subject to random shocks. In particular, a higher provincial tax rate
erodes both the federal and provincial tax base, leading to lower federal revenues. This vertical
tax externality implies that provincial governments that have not suffered a negative shock will
underestimate the marginal cost of public funds and over-provide public services. Under the
optimal fiscal policy, federal public goods are under-provided compared to those in a unitary
state because a lower federal tax rate reduces the distortion caused by vertical tax externality.
The equalization grant to a province that has suffered a negative shock is also set below the
level that would equalize the marginal cost of public funds between the provinces in order to
lower the federal tax rate. Therefore, the province with the negative shock would have a higher
MCF of funds than the province with the positive shock. In other words, because of the vertical
tax externality arising when federal and provincial governments utilize the same tax base, the
optimal equalization program would not eliminate the horizontal fiscal imbalances that arise
when some provinces are subject to negative economic shocks, contradicting Dahlby and
Wilson’s conjecture that the MCFs would be equalized.
Boadway and Tremblay also demonstrate that if the federal government cannot commit to this
optimal equalization program, and instead provides more generous transfers to a province in
the event of a negative shock, then the MCFs will be equalized across provinces and provincial
expenditures will be excessive. One important caveat to the Boadway and Tremblay result is
that the equalization transfer in their model is a lump sum and that it is not determined by a
formula such as the RTS formula. Smart has shown that such formulas reduce the perceived
MCFs of the equalization recipient provinces and they may be lower than that of the non-
recipient province.16 Admittedly, this makes it difficult to determine the extent and direction of
the horizontal fiscal imbalances based on the provinces’ perceived MCFs.
15 Robin Boadway and Jena-Francois Tremblay, Reassessment of the Tiebout Model,” Journal of Public Economics 96
(2012): 1063-1078.
16 Michael Smart, “Taxation and Deadweight Loss in a System of Intergovernmental Transfers,” Canadian Journal of
Economics 31, no. 1 (1998): 189-206.
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The Trade-Off between Efficiency and Fiscal Equity 
Two key assumptions underlie the Boadway and Flatters model that equalization transfers are
required to achieve an efficient regional allocation of labour. One is that the provincial publicly
provided goods and services have some degree of “publicness”. Second, the production
technology exhibits decreasing returns to labour in all provinces because of a fixed input such
as land or resources. Dahlby presents a model where these two assumptions are relaxed.17 The
justification for relaxing the first assumption is that most provincial expenditures are on health
care, education and social services, which can be characterized as quasi-private goods. Second,
the assumption of diminishing returns for an entire regional economy exaggerates the
importance of fixed inputs that give rise to economic rents because the resource sectors are
highly capital intensive and directly employ only a small fraction of the labour force in the
resource-rich regions. 
Dahlby’s model is based on Boadway and Tremblay’s model18 of imperfectly mobile labour in
a federation where subnational governments (provinces) levy distortionary taxes to finance
their expenditures. One of the provincial governments receives economic rent, whereas in the
Boadway and Tremblay model, economic rents are received directly by workers in one of the
provinces. The Dahlby model shows that an increase in economic rent received by a province
results in a Pareto improvement (i.e., both residents of the province that receives the economic
rent and residents of the other non-rent receiving provinces are better off as a result of a
vertical tax externality). The provincial government in the province that receives the economic
rents lowers its distortionary taxes, resulting in an expansion of the income tax base that allows
the federal government to lower its tax rates and maintain the same federal tax revenue. In this
model, therefore, there is no efficiency rationale for a fiscal transfer or equalization program as
in the Boadway and Flatters model. However, the economic rent received by one province
creates a fiscal imbalance between the two provinces. In this context, Dahlby analyzes the
effects of an equalization system with the objective of achieving fiscal equality. The framework
developed in this model is used to calculate the efficiency losses from the equalization program
in The Inclusion Rate for Resource Revenues section of this paper, found on page 16.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE CANADIAN EQUALIZATION SYSTEM
We begin by providing an overview of the Canadian equalization system as well as the other
major federal transfers to the provinces, the Canada Health Transfer (CHT) and the Canada
Social Transfer (CST). We document the conventional measures of a province’s fiscal capacity,
both with and without federal transfers. We then examine the trends in the dispersions of
provincial tax rates and per capita expenditures. This section provides the backdrop to the
analysis of policies to reform the equalization system.
17 Dahlby, “Notes on the Trade-Off between Efficiency and Fiscal Equity.” 
18 Robin Boadway and Jean-Francois Tremblay, “Mobility and Fiscal Imbalance,” National Tax Journal 63, no. 4 part 2
(2010): 1023-54.
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Fiscal Capacity Measures Used for Equalization
The conventional way to measure fiscal capacity has been to calculate the amount of revenue
per capita that a province could obtain from its main tax bases — personal income, business
income, consumption and property — if it imposed the national average tax rates on bases.
Provincial resource revenues are also included in the measures of fiscal capacity. Figure 1
shows these measures of the provinces’ fiscal capacities in 2011-12.
FIGURE 1 PER CAPITA YIELD AT NATIONAL AVERAGE TAX RATES, 2011-12
By these measures, Alberta had the highest fiscal capacity at $13,187, while Prince Edward
Island (P.E.I.) had the lowest at $5,315. Resource revenues represent over 40 per cent of
Newfoundland and Labrador’s measured fiscal capacity, and they are also significant
components of the fiscal capacity measures of Alberta (23 per cent), Saskatchewan (25 per
cent) and to a lesser extent British Columbia (8 per cent). These measures of fiscal capacity
are the basis for calculating the entitlements for equalization (unlike the other measures, only
50 per cent of resource revenues are included in the formula). Since 2009, entitlements have
been subject to a cap imposed by the federal government to limit the total amount of
equalization payments. 
Entitlements to equalization are calculated on the basis of a province’s fiscal deficiencies with
respect to the five revenue sources. Figure 2 shows these deficiencies based on the data for
2011-12. Provincial governments with above average fiscal capacities do not receive
equalization entitlements. Nor, it is important to note, do they contribute to the funding of
equalization payments. Alberta is the only province that has surplus fiscal capacities with
respect to all five revenue sources. P.E.I., Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec and Manitoba
have fiscal deficiencies with respect to all five revenue sources. Newfoundland and Labrador
has an overall surplus fiscal capacity because of its substantial resource revenues. Ontario has a
fiscal deficiency with respect to resource revenues and consumption taxes. In the absence of
the equalization of resource revenues, Ontario would not be eligible for equalization payments.
In the case of Quebec and the Maritime provinces, personal income and property taxes
deficiencies are the largest contributors to equalization entitlements. 
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FIGURE 2 PER CAPITA DEFICIENCY (+) OR EXCESS (-) FISCAL CAPACITY IN RELATION TO THE 10 PROVINCE STANDARD 
IN 2011-12
Table 1 shows the equalization payments to the provinces since 2000-01. Six provinces
representing 71 per cent of the Canadian population received equalization payments totalling
$16.1 billion dollars in 2013-14. Canada’s two largest provinces, Ontario and Quebec, received
20 per cent and 49 per cent of the equalization payments respectively. In per capita terms,
P.E.I. was the largest recipient province, receiving $2,317. Quebec and Ontario, by way of
comparison, received $966 and $232 respectively per capita. 
TABLE 1 TOTAL EQUALIZATION PAYMENTS BY PROVINCE
Source: Department of Finance Public Tables December 2012.
Note: Table includes payments and additional amounts. Does not include the Total Transfer Protection 
provided between 2010-11 and 2013-14. Does not include 2009-10 transition adjustment to N.S.
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 Property Taxes and Miscellaneous
 Natural Resources
 Consumption Taxes
 Business Income Taxes
 Personal Income Taxes
Nfld. P.E.I. N.S. N.B. Que. Ont. Man. Sask. Alta. B.C.
2000-01 1,112 269 1,404 1,260 5,380 0 1,314 208 0 0 10,948
2001-02 1,055 256 1,315 1,202 4,679 0 1,362 200 0 240 10,310
2002-03 875 235 1,122 1,143 4,004 0 1,303 106 0 71 8,859
2003-04 766 232 1,130 1,142 3,764 0 1,336 0 0 320 8,690
2004-05 762 277 1,313 1,326 4,155 0 1,607 772 0 682 10,894
2005-06 861 277 1,344 1,348 4,798 0 1,601 89 0 590 10,907
2006-07 687 291 1,386 1,451 5,539 0 1,709 13 0 459 11,535
2007-08 477 294 1,465 1,477 7,160 0 1,826 226 0 0 12,925
2008-09 0 322 1,465 1,584 8,028 0 2,063 0 0 0 13,462
2009-10 0 340 1,391 1,689 8,355 347 2,063 0 0 0 14,185
2010-11 0 330 1,110 1,581 8,552 972 1,826 0 0 0 14,372
2011-12 0 329 1,167 1,483 7,815 2,200 1,666 0 0 0 14,659
2012-13 0 337 1,268 1,495 7,391 3,261 1,671 0 0 0 15,423
2013-14 0 340 1,458 1,513 7,833 3,169 1,792 0 0 0 16,105
Nfld. P.E.I. N.S. N.B. Que. Ont. Man. Sask. Alta. B.C. Total
The other major transfers from the federal government to the provinces are the CHT and the
CST ($30.2 billion and $12.2 billion respectively in 2013-14), which evolved out of federal
matching grant programs in the 1960s to assist the provinces in the provision of health care
services, post-secondary education and social assistance programs. These programs have
evolved into block grants with only general restrictions on their use or entitlement (e.g.,
adherence to the principles of the Canada Health Act). Their historical origins, however, are
reflected in their names, and the provinces often compare their health care spending with the
magnitude of the CHT even though the basis for this comparison becomes less and less salient
with the passage of time, especially given the provinces’ constitutional responsibility for the
vast majority of publicly provided health care services. 
The CST is an equal per capita grant to the provinces of $347 in 2013-14, which is scheduled
to grow at three per cent annually. The CHT will be an equal per capita grant starting in 2014-
15. In December 2011, the federal government announced that the CHT will grow at six per
cent a year until 2016-17. Then, starting in 2017-18, the CHT will grow at a three-year moving
average of nominal GDP growth, with a minimum increase of three per cent per year for
subsequent years. Figure 3 shows the relative sizes of the three main block transfers to the
provinces in 2013-14. 
FIGURE 3 THE THREE MAJOR BLOCK GRANT PROGRAMS IN 2013-14
Figure 4 shows the per capita transfers to the provinces under the three major block transfer
programs in 2013-14. The combined average per capita CHT and CST was $1206 in 2013-14.
While equalization is only 27.5 per cent of the total federal block transfers to the provinces, it
is almost two-thirds of the total federal transfer to P.E.I. and New Brunswick, more than 50 per
cent of the total block transfer to Nova Scotia and Manitoba and the largest component of the
federal transfer to Quebec.
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FIGURE 4 FEDERAL BLOCK TRANSFERS TO THE PROVINCES IN 2013-14
A more complete picture of the fiscal capacities of the provinces emerges when we combine
the own-source measures of fiscal capacity in Figure 1 with the per capita transfers in Figure 4.
FIGURE 5 MEASURES OF FISCAL CAPACITY FROM OWN SOURCE REVENUES AND FEDERAL BLOCK TRANSFERS 
IN 2011-12
Combining federal transfers and own-source revenues, the average per capita revenue capacity
of the provinces in 2011-12 is $9,978, ranging from $14,115 in Alberta to $8,397 in P.E.I. The
coefficient of variation — the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean expressed as a
percentage — of the revenue capacity measures of the provinces was 20.6 per cent.
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Tax Rate Disparities
Have the fiscal disparities among the provinces increased in recent years? We begin by
examining the trend in summary measures of the variation in the tax rates imposed on the main
provincial tax bases. Figure 6 shows the trend in the coefficient of variation (CoV) and the
range of the top marginal personal income tax rates imposed by the provinces over the period
1972 to 2011.
FIGURE 6 COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION AND RANGE OF THE TOP MARGINAL PROVINCIAL INCOME TAX RATES
The figure shows that the variation in top marginal provincial personal income tax rates was
high in the mid-1970s and mid-1980s and then declined to a low point in the early 1990s. This
is consistent with the trend in oil and natural gas prices, which were high from the mid-70s to
the mid-80s and then declined after 1985. Since the mid-1990s, there has been a steady upward
trend in the coefficient of variation in provincial personal income tax rates such that by 2011
the degree of variation was comparable to the variation in the mid-70s and mid-80s. Broadly
speaking, the variation in personal income tax rates follows a pattern that is consistent with
more variation occurring when resource revenues are high. Other factors besides the size of
resource revenues, of course, influence the variation in tax rates, including the level and
distribution of federal transfers to the provinces.
Since provincial variations in corporate income tax (CIT) rates may influence the allocation of
capital across the provinces, monitoring the trend is of special significance. Figure 7 shows the
coefficient of variation and range of the provincial general CIT rates over the 1972-2011
period. As with the personal income tax, the variation in CIT rates was high in the mid-1980s
and then declined to a relatively low variation in the mid-1990s. The variation remained
relatively constant until 2008 and then has increased in 2010 and 2011 to the highest levels
observed since 1990. 
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FIGURE 7 COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION AND RANGE OF THE GENERAL PROVINCIAL CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES
Figure 8 shows the coefficient of variation and the range of provincial sales tax rates between
1972 and 2011. The variation in rates climbed abruptly from the mid-1970s, peaked in 1981,
followed by a slow convergence in rates that continued until 2006. Although there has been an
increase in the variation in provincial sales tax rates in recent years, the variation is small and
still lower than at any time since the mid-1990s.
FIGURE 8 COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION AND RANGE OF THE PROVINCIAL SALES TAX RATES
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FIGURE 9 COEFFICIENTS OF VARIATION IN THE PROVINCIAL PERSONAL INCOME TAX, CORPORATE INCOME TAX, 
AND SALES TAX RATES
Figure 9 shows that the variation in each of the three tax rates peaked in the mid-1970s to mid-
1980s during a period of relatively high resource revenues. In the years that followed, there
was a general decline in the variations in rates. While this decline ended in the early 1990s for
provincial personal income tax (PIT) rates, it continued until the mid-2000s for provincial sales
tax (PST) rates. The variation in PIT rates is now comparable to the variation in the mid-1980s.
While there have been recent increases in the variation in the CIT and PST rates, the degree of
variation is substantially lower than in the 1975-85 period for the PST and the 1980-85 period
for the CIT.
Spending Disparities
We now turn to the dispersion in provincial spending. Comparable data on provincial and local
government spending are currently only available from Statistics Canada for the 1981-2009
period. Figure 10 shows the trend in the coefficient of variation per capita total expenditures of
the provincial and local governments over this time period. For comparative purposes, we have
also plotted the coefficient of variation of the PIT rates.
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FIGURE 10 COEFFICIENTS OF VARIATION IN PROVINCIAL AVERAGE PER CAPITA EXPENDITURES AND 
PROVINCIAL PERSONAL INCOME TAX RATES
As the variation in per capita expenditures fell in the 1989-2000 period, the variation in
personal income tax rates rose. While variation in per capita expenditures gradually increased
in the 2000-10 period, it was still lower in 2009-10 than it was in 1989-90, meaning the degree
of dispersion in spending was within historical bounds. Another point to notice is that the
variation in provincial per capita expenditures is considerably lower that the dispersion in
provincial income tax rates. This is consistent with the predictions of the model used by
Dahlby that a resource-rich province will use its resource revenues to lower its tax rates, while
the recipient provinces will adopt relatively high tax rates because the equalization formula
compensates them for the reductions in their tax bases when they increase their tax rates.19 This
effectively reduces their perceived MCFs, inducing them to finance relatively high
expenditures at relatively high tax rates.
Finally, Figure 11 shows that average annual growth rate of provincial and local government
expenditures over the period 1989-90 to 2009-10. At 3.99 per cent, Newfoundland and
Labrador experienced the highest growth rate, while Alberta experienced the lowest (2.87 per
cent). In terms of levels of expenditures, Newfoundland and Labrador had the highest per
capita in 2009-10 at $14,008, followed by Saskatchewan ($13,936), Quebec ($13,751) and
Alberta ($13,415). Ontario had the lowest per capita expenditure rate ($11,307).
19 Dahlby, “Notes on the Trade-Off between Efficiency and Fiscal Equity.”
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FIGURE 11 AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PER CAPITA EXPENDITURES, 
1989-90 TO 2009-10
ISSUES IN THE REFORM OF THE EQUALIZATION PROGRAM
In this section of the paper, we examine the prominent proposals for equalization reform that
have been put forward by commentators and provincial governments. We begin with a
discussion of the inclusion rate for resource revenues in the computation of equalization
entitlements. Then, on page 22, we discuss the removal of the ceiling on total equalization
grants. In the following subsection, we consider the proposal to exempt entitlements that are
deposited in provincial social welfare funds from the calculation of equalization. Next, we
examine a proposal to reduce the CHT and the CST to provinces with above average fiscal
capacities. In the subsection on page 27, we consider incorporating variations in costs and
needs in the computation of the equalization entitlements by reviewing the Gusen (2012) proto-
type needs based system. We conclude the section by briefly noting some other fiscal reforms
that have been paired with the reform of the equalization system.
The Inclusion Rate for Resource Revenues
The inclusion rate for natural resource revenues is one of the most important and controversial
aspects of the equalization system. The average provincial per capita fiscal capacity from
resource revenue in 2011-12 was $695, which was only a quarter of the personal income tax
and consumption fiscal capacity measures. However, resource revenues are concentrated in
three provinces — Newfoundland and Labrador, Saskatchewan and Alberta — and this implies
that a substantial proportion of the equalization entitlements can be driven by the resource
revenues. For example, using the 2011-12 figures for fiscal capacity, total equalization
entitlements would have been $24.2 billion with a 100 per cent inclusion rate, $17.8 billion
with a 50 per cent rate, $14.5 billion with a 25 per cent rate and $12.8 billion if resource
revenues were excluded from the calculation altogether. In other words, a 50 per cent inclusion
rate reduces total equalization entitlements by about 25 per cent compared to entitlements with
a 100 per cent inclusion rate. 
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Thus the inclusion rate has a significant effect on the total quantum of equalization (assuming
no aggregate cap on equalization payments) and substantial effects on the entitlements of
individual provinces. If resource revenues were not included in the equalization formula, for
example, Ontario would not receive equalization. Given its importance, it is not surprising that
the inclusion rate has been the focus of much of the debate concerning reforms to the
equalization system. For example, the Drummond Commission recommended that Ontario
“advocate for reforms to Equalization by, at a minimum, fully capturing resource revenues…”20
The Expert Panel Report recommended that the federal government adopt a 50 per cent
inclusion rate rather than full inclusion not over affordability concerns, but because, as Paul
Boothe noted, “it flowed from the principle that provinces should enjoy some net benefit from
their ownership of resources — even if they were recipients of Equalization payments.”21
Calculations based on the 2011-12 fiscal capacities illustrate how the inclusion rate affects a
province’s net benefit from its resource revenues. For example, with a 100 per cent inclusion
rate, New Brunswick’s fiscal capacity would only increase $2.20 if it received an extra $100
per capita in resource revenues — an effective claw-back rate of 97.8 per cent. For Quebec, the
claw-back rate would be 76.7 per cent. 
Between the costs resource development impose on the provinces and their control over
royalty, pricing and general development policies, it is clear that a 100 per cent inclusion rate,
as recommended by the Drummond Commission, would create a severe disincentive for
resource development and revenue collection by the recipient provinces. The claw-back rate
declines in proportion to the inclusion rate. A 50 per cent inclusion rate, therefore, still
represents a 48.9 per cent claw-back rate for New Brunswick and a 38.4 per cent claw-back
rate for Quebec. One of the challenges that policy makers face when determining the inclusion
rate is balancing the incentive effects on provincial resource development and pricing policies
against narrowing the disparities in provincial fiscal capacities. Another challenge concerns the
federal financing of equalization entitlements. Without directly contributing anything to its
coffers, higher resource revenues increase the amount (in the absence of an aggregate cap) the
federal government must pay in equalization, leaving Ottawa to finance the payments from its
general revenues — principally its personal and corporate income revenues, GST and excise
tax revenues.
20 Commission on the Reform of Ontario’s Public Services. Public Services for Ontarians: A Path to Sustainability and
Excellence (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2012), 536, Recommendation 20-3.
21 Paul Boothe, “Introduction and Summary.” in A Fine Canadian Compromise: Perspectives on the Report of the
Expert Panel on Equalization and Territorial Funding Financing, ed. Paul Boothe and Francois Vaillancourt, 1-11.
(Edmonton: Institute of Public Economics, University of Alberta; Montreal: CIRANO (Centre interuniversitaire de
recherche en analyse des organisations)), 2007), p. 8. Expert Panel on Equalization and Territorial Formula
Financing. Achieving a National Purpose: Putting Equalization Back on Track. Ottawa: Department of Finance
Canada, 2006.
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Recent commentaries on reform, as the following quotations indicate, recognize the problems
created by the mismatch between the main sources of federal tax revenues and the equalization
entitlements created by provincial resource revenues:
As currently designed, equalization cannot undo imbalances between have
and have-not provinces. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the federal
government to finance full equalization commitments with only limited
access to the main source of imbalances.22
A key reason why energy royalties pose such a challenge for the
equalization program is that the federal government cannot constitutionally
access provincial energy royalties/rents. Hence, any equalization payments
driven by these energy royalties/rents must come out of the federal
government’s consolidated revenue fund which, in turn, means that the
provinces’ shares of this funding are not far off their population shares.23
Reform options must acknowledge that the federal government collects
almost no resource royalties and that the funds available to the federal
government for redistribution come disproportionately from the Ontario
corporate, personal, and consumption tax bases.24
The problem arising from this mismatch was first pointed out by Tom Courchene during the
first oil price boom in the 1970s. Since that time, it has played an important role in shaping the
program, including the adoption of the five ‘representative’ province standard in 1982 and,
more recently, the cap on total equalization entitlements in 2009. As is widely acknowledged,
the mismatch raises equity and efficiency issues that constrain or shape the equalization
program. In this section, we try to advance the discussion of this issue by analyzing (albeit in a
limited form) the trade-off between efficiency and entitlement.
When the federal government raises taxes to pay for equalization entitlements arising from
resource rents, the higher tax rates erode incentives to work, save and invest in all of the
provinces. Appendix 1 contains a description of how the efficiency loss from the federal
financing of the equalization program can be calculated using the MCF concept and how this
loss varies as the resource revenue inclusion rate varies. Here we will only try to provide an
intuitive explanation. When resource revenues in Alberta or any non-recipient province
increase, the equalization entitlements of the recipient provinces increase. (We are again
assuming that there is no ceiling on total equalization payments. The issue of the ceiling will
be dealt with in the next section of this paper.) We assume that the federal government
increases personal income tax rates in order to finance the increase in equalization payments.  
22 Robin Boadway, Serge Coulombe, and Jean-Francois Tremblay, “Canadian Policy Prescriptions for Dutch Disease,”
IRPP Insight 3 (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2013), 18.  
23 Thomas Courchene, Surplus Recycling and the Canadian Federation: Addressing Horizontal and Vertical Fiscal
Imbalances. Mowat Centre Fiscal Transfer Series 6, (Toronto: Mowat Centre and School of Governance and Public
Policy, University of Toronto, July 2013), 11. 
24 Matthew Mendelsohn, Back to Basics: The Future of the Fiscal Arrangements. Mowat Centre Fiscal Transfers Series
5, (Toronto: Mowat Centre, School of Public Policy and Governance, University of Toronto, 2012), 1. 
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The increase in federal tax rates applies to incomes earned in all provinces and creates
additional disincentive effects to work, save and invest. These disincentive effects also affect
provincial income tax revenues because the federal and provincial personal income tax bases
overlap. Thus, the cost of a federal personal income tax rate increase is not only the additional
federal tax revenue and the loss caused by the induced reallocation of resources, it also
includes the reduction in provincial tax revenues valued according to the provincial
governments’ MCFs. 
Using Dahlby and Ferede’s econometric estimates of the responsiveness of the personal income
tax bases, the MCFs for the federal and provincial governments from a personal income tax
rate increase based on 2011 rates are shown in Table 2.25 The MCFs for the recipient province
are generally lower than for the non-recipient provinces because the equalization system
compensates them when their tax base declines from an increase in their income tax rate.26
The columns in Table 2 show the gain to each recipient province from its equalization
entitlement, where the entitlement is valued at the province’s marginal cost of public funds. If
resource revenues were not included in the equalization formula, Ontario would not be a
recipient of equalization payments. The total gain to the recipient provinces would be $16.41
billion. The cost, however, of financing equalization grants from a country-wide federal
personal income tax increase would be $16.67 billion, which would result in an annual net
welfare or efficiency loss of $259.04 million or $7.55 per capita. 
TABLE 2 CALCULATING THE EFFICIENCY-FISCAL EQUITY TRADE-OFF
25 Dahlby and Ferede, “The Effects of Tax Rate Changes,” 844–883.
26 For the incentive effects of the equalization grant system, see Michael Smart, “Taxation and Deadweight Loss in a
System of Intergovernmental Transfers,” Canadian Journal of Economics 31, no. 1 (1998): 189-206.  For the
computations that underlie these figures, see Dahlby and Ferede, “The Effects of Tax Rate Changes,” 844–883.
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Nfld. 1.690 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P.E.I. 1.045 303.33 329.62 355.91 408.50
N.S. 1.151 1,590.81 1,730.88 1,870.94 2,151.07
N.B. 0.928 1,270.58 1,359.99 1,449.41 1,628.24
Que. 1.426 11,673.45 12,511.77 13,350.09 15,026.72
Ont. 1.297 0.00 994.00 3,900.46 9,713.38
Man. 1.024 1,575.41 1,740.86 1,906.31 2,237.22
Sask. 1.860 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Alta. 1.440 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
B.C. 1.820 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Federal Financing 1.306 -16,672.63 -18,969.93 -23,192.97 -31,639.05
Net Gain (millions of $) -259.04 -302.81 -359.85 -473.92
Net Gain ($ per capita) -7.55 -8.82 -10.48 -13.80
Coefficient of Variation in 27.49 25.85 25.17 23.82
Fiscal Capacity (%)
Net Gain or Loss from the Equalization Transfers Valued at the 
Provincial and Federal MCFs in Millions of Dollars
Resource Revenue Inclusion Rate, γ
MCF 0.00 0.25 0.50 1.00
In the absence of equalization entitlements from resource revenues, there would be a large
variation in fiscal capacities across provinces. As a summary measure of the degree of fiscal
inequity, we report the coefficient of variation in provincial fiscal capacities. In the absence of
equalization entitlements due to resource revenues, the coefficient of variation in fiscal
capacity would be 27.49 per cent. With a 25 per cent resource revenue inclusion rate, Ontario
would be an equalization recipient and the coefficient of variation in fiscal capacity would
decrease to 25.85 per cent. The increase in federal taxes to pay for the increase in equalization
would increase the cost of the program valued at the federal MCF of 1.306 to $18.97 billion,
and the equalization program would result in a net welfare loss of $302.81 million or $8.82 per
capita. The last two columns show the net welfare losses and the coefficients of variation with
inclusion rates of 0.50 and 1.00. 
These calculations illustrate the general proposition that there is an efficiency-equity trade-off
with the equalization program, and that while increasing the resource revenue inclusion rate
reduces the degree of fiscal inequality, the higher federal taxes that are required to finance the
enriched transfers raise the aggregate welfare loss. This trade-off is illustrated in Figure 12,
which plots the per capita welfare loss against the coefficient of variation in the fiscal
capacities of the provinces. The computations also indicate that there is a cost associated with
increasing the resource inclusion rate to reduce fiscal inequality. The marginal cost of reducing
fiscal inequality by one percentage point is $0.78 per capita in going from zero to a 25 per cent
inclusion rate. This amount increases to $2.42 in going from 0.25 to 0.50 and higher still —
$2.47 — in going from 0.50 to 1.00.
FIGURE 12 THE EFFICIENCY-FISCAL EQUITY TRADE-OFF WITH VARIATIONS IN THE RESOURCE REVENUE INCLUSION RATE
In the words of the 18th century philosopher David Hume “the distinction of vice and virtue is
not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason.”27 In the more
prosaic words of a 21st century economist, the existence of an efficiency loss does not
invalidate the rationale for an equalization program. Many may feel that $474 million, or 
27 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III: Of Morals. First published in 1738.
http://www.webpages.uidaho.edu/jcanders/Ethics/david_humerp.htm
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$13.80 per capita, is a reasonable price to pay for the full inclusion of resource revenues in the
equalization formula and the reduction (but not elimination) in the variation of fiscal capacities
among the provinces. What the calculations in Table 2 do not take into account, however, is the
adverse effect the inclusion rate has on the provinces’ willingness to develop their resources and
collect revenues through royalties and pricing schemes. It is assumed that the level of resource
revenue is independent of the inclusion rate and the total welfare loss from increasing the
inclusion rate could be substantially greater if these incentive effects were taken into account.
Including the hydro rents that residents of Quebec and Manitoba receive because of the “under-
pricing” of electricity by their respective provincial utilities as resource revenue for the
purposes of equalization entitlements is another frequently suggested reform. As has been
pointed out by Mendelsohn, the current reduction in electricity prices in North America means
that this issue could be addressed without greatly affecting the equalization entitlement of the
two provinces.28 The fact that Quebec would like the anomalous treatment of Hydro Quebec
and Ontario’s Hydro One addressed further opens the door to reform.
Finally, let us deal with an argument that is made from time to time that resource revenues
should be excluded from the equalization formula because the sale of a non-renewable resource
is simply the transformation of an asset in the ground into a financial asset and, therefore, does
not constitute a true source of income.  Asserting that the transformation of a physical asset into
a financial asset does not generate income is inconsistent with standard economic measures of
income.29 For example, if one sells a one oz. gold bar for $1,250 and buys a bond with the
proceeds, he or she has transformed a physical asset into a financial asset. The Canada Revenue
Agency, however, will want to know how much he or she paid for the gold bar in order to
determine the capital gain that was made. Say the gold bar been purchased for $250, the capital
gain would be $1000, on which he or she would then be obligated to pay tax on half.
According to the Hague-Simons definition, income equals consumption plus the change in net
worth. If we record income from capital gains on a realization basis, then income is generated
at the time of the sale of a physical asset if the cost of acquiring the asset is less than the sale
price. On this basis, when a provincial government receives revenues from royalties or bonus
bids, it is selling a physical asset and receiving income if the proceeds exceed the amount that
the province spent to generate the revenue. From this point of view, the non-renewable
resource revenue (minus the public expenditures that have been made to develop the resource)
should be included in the province’s fiscal capacity as it can be used to fund current operating
or capital expenditures, lower taxes or reduce debt.
If we recorded capital gains as they accrue due to changes in the prices of the underlying assets
as opposed to on a realization basis, then we would record as provincial income any increase or
reduction in the value of the oil and gas reserves due to price changes. Of course, this would not
be practical because of the huge measurement problems involved in valuing the changes in the
value of oil and gas reserves. Thus the argument for partial inclusion of resource revenues is not
based on the notion that “it is not a true source of income,” but rather is based on efficiency
arguments stemming from the federal financing of equalization payments from general taxation
and from the disincentive effects for resource development and revenue generation.
28 Mendelsohn, Back to Basics.   
29 See Kenneth Boessenkool, Ten Reasons to Remove Non-Renewable Resources from Equalization (Halifax:  Atlantic
Institute for Market Studies, 2002), 5; Robert Murphy and Brian Lee Crowley, Equalization Reform: Promoting
Equity and Wise Stewardship (Ottawa:  MacDonald-Laurier Institute, 2013), fn 11.  
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Removal of the Ceiling on Total Equalization Payments
Currently, there is a ceiling on total federal expenditure on equalization that increases with the
rate of nominal GDP growth. The imposition of the ceiling on equalization payments by the
federal government in 2009 has been widely criticized. According to Mendelsohn, Ontario has
lost $1.1 billion in equalization payments in 2012-13, or 55 per cent of the total reduction in
equalization payments, from the imposition of the ceiling.30 The Quebec government estimates
the reduction in equalization transfers in 2012-13 at $3 billion, arguing that, without the
ceiling, equalization payments in 2012-13 would have been close to the historical average of
1.04 per cent of GDP instead of 0.86 per cent (see Figure 13).
Other countries also have a fixed allocation for equalization grants. In Australia, for example,
equalization payments are based on total GST revenues. However, sub-national governments in
other federations are less reliant on own-source tax revenues to fund their expenditures and
these revenues may fluctuate due to regional economic conditions.
FIGURE 13 EQUALIZATION PAYMENTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF CANADIAN NOMINAL GDP
Source: Quebec (2013, Appendix E.20)
The Canadian equalization system has placed little emphasis on equalization’s insurance role in
spreading the fiscal effects of temporary regional shocks across all taxpayers. What is more,
the imposition of the ceiling on total equalization payments has limited the extent to which
shocks are shared across regions. For example, suppose there is a 10 per cent reduction in
Ontario’s non-resource revenue fiscal capacity and that the fiscal capacities of the other
provinces remained the same. As a result of the ceiling, Ontario’s equalization grants would
increase while the per capita equalization grants of the other recipient provinces would be
reduced. The residents of the non-recipient provinces, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia
and Newfoundland and Labrador, would not see a change in their federal grants, assuming that
the CHT and the CST remain fixed per capita grants. As a result of the ceiling, the fiscal
impacts of province-specific shocks are limited to the taxpayers in the equalization-receiving
provinces and are not shared by all taxpayers throughout the country.
30 Mendelsohn, Back to Basics, 17.    
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The purpose of the ceiling imposed by the federal government in 2009 was simple: to ensure
rapid increases in resource revenues would not result in an attendant spike in the provinces’
equalization entitlements, which, of course, Ottawa is responsible for funding. The current
equalization system includes 50 per cent of a province’s resource revenues in measuring its
fiscal capacity. As outlined in the previous section, there are a number of reasons why a partial
inclusion rate for resource revenues is appropriate, including the difficulties in measuring all
resource rents accurately in assessing a province’s fiscal capacities (e.g., the aforementioned
issue of hydro rents in Manitoba and Quebec). Arguably, the most important reason, however,
is that the bulk of resource revenues accrue to the provinces, not the federal government, and
therefore, the federal tax base does not increase dollar for dollar with resource revenues.
Higher federal personal, corporate and sales tax rates to fund higher equalization payments
would distort economic activity and reduce investment and growth across the country. 
According to Feehan, 25 per cent has historically been considered the appropriate inclusion
rate for resource revenues. From many perspectives, the 50 per cent inclusion rate
recommended in the Expert Panel Report was too high, and its adoption led to the imposition
of the ceiling on total equalization payments when resource revenues escalated. With a 25 per
cent inclusion rate for resource revenues, the total equalization payment would have been
$15.5 billion in 2012-2013, almost the same total amount as with the current system with a
50 per cent inclusion rate and a ceiling on the growth of equalization payments. With the
adoption of a 25 per cent inclusion rate for resource revenues and the removal of the ceiling on
equalization payments, there would be gains and losses among the recipient provincial
governments. However, the removal of the ceiling on total equalization payments would
eliminate the zero-sum game aspect of the current program, which means that only the
recipient provinces bear the burden of a negative fiscal shock to one of the recipient provinces. 
Exempting Resource Revenues Deposited in a Provincial Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Related to the aforementioned asset transformation argument is the view that resource revenues
that are deposited in a provincial sovereign wealth fund (SWF) should not be included in the
measures of fiscal capacity; only withdrawals from such funds should be used to calculate
equalization entitlements.31 While there are some merits to this proposal, there are also a
number of shortcomings, including the fact it would not reduce the total equalization payment
in present value terms, would be complex and contentious to administer and would not alter
the decision of provinces concerning whether or not to save a greater proportion of their
resource revenues. Each of these points is discussed below.
First, to see that the quantum of equalization would not be affected by this proposal, let R be
the non-renewable resource revenues received in a given year by a province. If these revenues
are spent in the current year, they would be considered fiscal capacity and included in the
equalization formula (or perhaps, as under the current arrangement, only 50 per cent of them).
31 See Boadway, Coulombe, and Tremblay, “Canadian Policy Prescriptions for Dutch Disease”; Courchene, Surplus
Recycling and the Canadian Federation; and Murphy and Crowley, Equalization Reform: Promoting Equity and
Wise Stewardship.   
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If they were put in a SWF by the provincial government, they would generate an annual
income flow of iR where i is the rate of return earned by the fund. If the province uses this
interest income from the fund to finance public expenditures, its fiscal capacity for equalization
purposes would be iR. But this would generate a perpetual flow of fiscal capacity that would
have a present value of (iR)/i = R. In other words, assuming a stable equalization system, the
impact on the present value of the recipient provinces’ equalization entitlements would be the
same whether we count the resource revenues when they are received or the flow of interest
income if it is saved in a fund. Consequently, the long-run fiscal impacts on the federal
government or the recipient provinces would not be affected by the proposed treatment of
resource revenues deposited in SWFs.
Of course, if resource revenues placed in SWFs were not included in measures of current fiscal
capacity, there would be differences in the timing of the equalization payments and there would
be advantages from a public policy perspective in smoothing these equalization payments.
However, there would be practical difficulties with the proposal. Resource revenues that are
used to pay down a provincial government’s debt should be treated in the same way as those
deposited in a SWF, but it would be very difficult to record, for equalization purposes, the
increase in a province’s current fiscal capacity because it used resource revenues 20 years
before to pay down its debt. Also, a provincial government might put its resource revenues in a
SWF fund, reducing its reported fiscal capacity in the current year, and then run a deficit equal
to the amount of the resource revenue it received that year. Effectively, it would be using its
current resource revenue as fiscal capacity, but then excluding it from the calculation of its
entitlement for equalization payments. The federal government and the other provinces would
have to scrutinize the changes in the net financial assets of the provinces in order to prevent
such gaming of the system, a move that would be intrusive and highly contentious.
Finally, the way in which resource revenues are recorded for the equalization program provides
little incentive for a provincial government, such as Alberta, to save its resource revenues.
Albertans pay about 15 per cent of federal taxes. A change in federal equalization payments
provides little incentive for the Alberta government to save more of the province’s resource
revenues. Indeed, the provincial government’s savings decisions and the treatment of resource
revenues in the calculation of equalization entitlements are two separate decisions made by two
separate levels of government. 
Equalization of CHT and CST
In view of the large disparities in measured fiscal capacities even with the equalization
transfers, and the fact that the CST is an equal per capita grant and the CHT soon will be,
Boadway et al., Mendelsohn and Courchene have argued that the CST and the CHT should be
reduced for those provinces with higher fiscal capacities.32 As an example of how the clawback
of the CHT and the CST might operate, Courchene has suggested that:
if a province has a per capita all-in fiscal capacity above a certain threshold,
say 115%, of the per capita national average of all-in fiscal capacity, then
for each dollar per capita of a province’s revenues above this threshold, 
32 Boadway, Coulombe, and Tremblay, “Canadian Policy Prescriptions for Dutch Disease”; Mendelsohn, Back to
Basics; and Courchene, Surplus Recycling and the Canadian Federation.
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Ottawa would reduce its CHT/CST transfer to this province by, say, 25 cents
per capita. Given that the current value of the CHT/CST is roughly $1,200
per capita…, if a province has an all-in fiscal capacity of $4,800 or more per
capita above the 115% per capita threshold, then its CHT/CST will fall to
zero. The resulting CHT/CST clawbacks would then be redistributed to
those provinces with per capita revenues below the threshold.33
Figure 14 shows the claw-back of the CHT and the CST transfers, renamed the Courchene
Transfer, would have affected the fiscal capacities of the provinces in 2011-12.
FIGURE 14 TOTAL REVENUE CAPACITIES OF THE PROVINCES WITH THE COURCHENE TRANSFER IN 2011-12
Alberta would only have been eligible for $244 per capita compared to the average of $1,117,
and the six recipient provinces and British Columbia would have received $1,245. With this
clawback of the CHT and the CST in 2011-12, the variation in the revenue capacities of the
provinces would have been reduced, with the coefficient of variation falling from 20.6 per cent
to 17.2 per cent.
It is important to consider the incentive effects of clawing back transfers as the fiscal capacity or
the revenues of a province improve. As they are the only provinces with all-in revenue capacities
that are 15 per cent above the average, only Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Newfoundland and
Labrador would have their incentives to raise taxes or increase resource revenues affected with
the claw-back mechanism proposed by Courchene. These provinces would have an incentive to
reduce (or at least not increase) their royalties on natural resources or make their regulatory
approval of resource projects more restrictive because they would lose $25 in CHT and CST
revenues for every additional $100 of resource revenue they received. While this claw-back rate
is less than that one the recipient provinces encounter under the 50 per cent inclusion rate, it
could have a larger effect on investments and revenues for the simple fact that Saskatchewan,
Alberta, and Newfoundland and Labrador have greater potential resource revenues.
33 Courchene, Surplus Recycling and the Canadian Federation, 16. 
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The claw-back of the CHT and the CST would also affect these provinces’ incentives to raise
tax rates on the other tax bases. As in the case of the recipient provinces, the claw-back would
reduce a province’s perceived marginal cost of public funds from raising its personal income,
corporate and sales taxes because the declines in these tax bases resulting from a rate increase
would be offset by higher CHT and CST grants. (Of course the increase in the CHT and the
CST grants to these provinces would come at the expense of the other seven provinces.) For
example, based on the 2011 tax rates, the claw-back would reduce the marginal cost of public
funds for a personal income tax rate increase for Saskatchewan from 1.86 to 1.49. There would
be an incentive, therefore, for Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Newfoundland and Labrador to raise
their personal, corporate and consumption tax rates while reducing their resource revenues
because 25 per cent of the revenue changes would come at the expense of the other provinces.
This is an unintended consequence of a claw-back of the CHT and the CST, and it should be
borne in mind, especially in view of the rather modest impact that a 25 per cent claw-back
would have on the overall disparity in the revenue capacities of the provincial governments.
However, the main problem with proposals to claw-back the CHT and the CST from provinces
with revenue capacities above some threshold is that it confuses the rationales for the
equalization program and the CHT and the CST. While the purpose of the equalization transfer
is to address horizontal fiscal imbalances among the provinces, the CHT and the CST are
meant to address the vertical fiscal imbalance between the federal and provincial governments.
As noted earlier in this paper, vertical fiscal imbalances arise in a federation because tax bases
of the provincial governments are generally more tax sensitive than the federal tax bases. That
is to say, tax bases are generally more mobile across provincial boundaries than across
international boundaries. What is more, the provincial governments are constitutionally
responsible for the “big ticket items” in a modern state (i.e., health, education and social
welfare). 
Alberta’s fiscal capacity with respect to the personal, business and consumption tax bases
would appear to be greater than that of the federal government, which could be proxied by the
10-province average that is used to compute equalization payments. The province also levies
property taxes and receives resource revenues. Like those of the other provinces, however,
Alberta’s tax bases are much more tax sensitive than the equivalent federal tax bases. Dahlby
and Ferede argue that the long-run semi-elasticity of the corporate income tax base is -12.034
for a provincial CIT rate increase, but only -1.881 for a federal CIT rate increase.34 For a
personal income tax rate increase, the long-run semi-elasticity of the tax base is -3.073 for a
provincial PIT rate increase, but only -0.495 for a federal PIT rate increase.35 These differences
in the tax sensitivities of the PIT and CIT bases at the federal and provincial levels are
reflected in Alberta having a higher MCF for these taxes than the federal government as shown
by the computation in Table 2. Because tax bases at the provincial level are more tax sensitive
than at the federal level, Alberta and the other provinces need block transfers to reduce the
imbalance in their fiscal capacity with the federal government.
In designing a fiscal transfer system, the political impulse “to equalize everything” should be
avoided. Rather, we should design the fiscal transfer system so that it addresses the two
separate fiscal issues — horizontal imbalances and vertical imbalances. Two separate
programs, therefore, are needed to accomplish these goals: equalization transfers to address 
34 Dahlby and Ferede, “The Effects of Tax Rate Changes,” 844–883.
35 A semi-elasticity indicates the percentage change in the tax base from a one percentage point increase in the tax rate.
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horizontal fiscal imbalances among the provinces and block transfers to address vertical fiscal
imbalances between the provinces and Ottawa. In other words, we should fix the equalization
program rather than bend the other block transfer programs out of shape.
Given the importance of the CHT and the CST in the fiscal transfer system, the design of the
two merits attention. Equal per capita lump-sum transfers are consistent with the theory of
intergovernmental transfers given that the equalization program addresses horizontal fiscal
imbalances (recognizing, of course, that the equalization program will not fully equalize the
fiscal capacities, as conventionally measured, of the provinces because of the financing and
incentive constraints discussed in the Frameworks for Evaluating Equalization Transfers section
of this report). Furthermore, the CHT and the CST should be combined into a single block
transfer, perhaps re-labelled the “Canada Transfer” so that these transfers are no longer linked to
the provision of health care, post-secondary education or social assistance. Given that their
primary purpose is to address the vertical fiscal imbalances between the federal and provincial
governments’ revenue raising capacity, (something that affects all areas of provincial spending,
not just health education and social services), the CHT should not be viewed simply as a “health
care” grant and the CST as a “post-secondary education” grant.  Linking these transfers to health
care, post-secondary education and social assistance has obscured in the public’s mind the
provinces’ responsibility for these programs, and thus, has reduced accountability. If we are to
address the serious problem of rising health care costs, which have been highlighted in the
Parliamentary Budget Office’s projections, clear lines of responsibility are necessary.
In this, Prime Minister Harper’s comments are correct: it is up to the provinces to solve the
health care funding problem. By linking future increases in the block grants to the growth rate
of the economy, the federal government can overcome the soft-budget constraint that seems to
have prevented the provinces from finding innovative ways to address the growth of health
care costs (e.g., using private clinics to provide basic health care services, as Saskatchewan is
now trying, or making use of the health care system a taxable benefit with appropriate
coinsurance rates to prevent excessive hardship in the event of catastrophic payments).
Determining the quantum of funding so that the block transfers adequately address the vertical
fiscal imbalances between the federal and provincial governments will be an ongoing
challenge. It should not, however, be overshadowed by the task of addressing the horizontal
fiscal imbalances through the equalization program.
Incorporating Costs and Needs in Equalization Formula
Unlike the Australian equalization system, the Canadian system has never incorporated
provincial variations in the costs of providing public services or variations in measures of the
need for services. There are major conceptual and practical problems with introducing cost and
needs components in the equalization formula. A recent study by Gusen, however, indicates
that a reasonable and practical approach may be feasible.36 Both Mendelsohn and Courchene
endorse the use of needs and cost factors along the lines developed by Gusen.37 In their view,
Ontario is being “short changed” by the current equalization system as it ignores Ontario’s
higher costs of providing public services and its greater need for spending in certain areas. 
36 Peter Gusen, “Expenditure Needs: Equalization’s Other Half,” Mowat Centre 46. (Toronto: Mowat Centre, School of
Public Policy and Governance, University of Toronto, 2012).
37 Mendelsohn, Back to Basics; and Courchene, Surplus Recycling and the Canadian Federation.
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As Courchene’s puts it “the equalization program…is too generous to those provinces that have
traditionally received equalization, but provides inadequate transfers to Ontario.”38 What
follows is a discussion of some of the conceptual issues with incorporating cost and need
factors in the equalization program, followed by an examination of the specific proposal
developed by Gusen.39
Public sector wages and salaries are a key determinant of the cost of public services.
Incorporating this factor directly into the equalization formula, however, would create a huge
incentive problem because provinces would be able to grant more generous wage settlement to
their employees, while at the same time, increasing their equalization entitlement. To avoid
this, an index of the average private sector wages and salaries should be used as an index of
cost. Population density and the number of remote communities are two other factors that
affect the cost of providing public services in a given province. By providing the provinces
with the financial means needed to service these communities, equalization arguably inhibits
the transition to more economically viable population distributions. Equalization entitlements
based on remoteness or density would not compel the provinces to spend the funds to address
the higher costs of services. In Australia, the failure of the state governments to align their
spending with their needs entitlements has been a major point of contention. Similar
controversies might arise in Canada if a needs component were introduced, a move that could
bring the entire equalization system into disrepute.
At the conceptual level, there are problems in defining the “need” for public services versus the
level of public services that are actually “demanded.” In common usage, a need is something
basic and essential. Viewed in this way, a “needed” public service would be a basic level of
service that is essential in a modern state. Given the current levels of taxation and
intergovernmental grants, it can be argued that “needed” public services are currently provided
to all, or virtually all, Canadians and therefore, there is no need to include a need component in
the equalization formula.
Of course, the advocates of such a component do not define needs in this way. They think of
needs as the expenditure required to fund the average level of service actually provided by the
provinces. The demographic makeup of a given province will play an important role in
determining how much it will cost to provide the average level of service. For example, it has
been estimated that the average cost of health care services is five times as great for persons
over the age of 65 compared to those under 65, meaning that per capita health care costs will
be higher in Nova Scotia, where 16 per cent of the province’s the population is 65 or over, than
in Alberta, where just under 11 per cent of Albertans are 65 or over.40
38 Courchene, Surplus Recycling and the Canadian Federation, 1.
39 For theoretical models of equalization grant systems that include a needs component based on cost and demographic
differences among provinces, see Dahlby and Leonard Wilson, “Fiscal Capacity,” 657-672; and Dahlby, “An Optimal
Taxation Approach to Intergovernmental Grants.” 
40 Government of Quebec, Budget Plan: Budget 2013-2014 (Quebec City: Ministry of Finance and Economy, 2012),
E29. 
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Actual program expenditures also reflect differences in preferences or the priority assigned to
public services across provinces. It is not clear why a stronger preference for a public service
in one province should necessitate increased federal funding to other provinces. Suppose
Ontario decides to greatly expand its spending on public housing. In many formulations of the
needs component of an equalization program, this would result in higher equalization
entitlements in all recipient provinces. Would the increased payments to those provinces really
reflect increased need in those provinces when the spending is taking place in Ontario to solve
an Ontario problem?
In selecting the needs components, it would be important to avoid creating more opportunities
for provinces to adopt fiscal and regulatory policies that would increase their equalization
entitlements. If, as Kryvoruchko argues, the number of unemployed is included in the needs
component, a province would have an incentive to increase its minimum wage or to offer
short-term employment programs that allow workers to qualify for employment insurance,
thereby increasing its needs entitlement under equalization.41 MacNevin argues that the level of
provincial debt is another needs factor.42 However, basing equalization payments on the level
of provincial debt would only encourage and reward irresponsible fiscal behaviour by the
provinces.
While there are conceptual and practical problems with incorporating cost and needs elements
in the equalization system, similar problems also exist with the measurement of fiscal capacity.
In that case, the equalization system has managed to overcome (or, in some cases, overlook)
those problems, resulting in a system that, while far from perfect, functions reasonably well.
An important step towards incorporating the cost and needs elements in the equalization
system has recently been made by Gusen who has developed a “prototype” needs based
equalization system.43 Here, we will only provide a brief summary of the methodology that
Gusen uses to construct the needs based prototype equalization entitlements.
The Gusen prototype reflects variations in costs, geographic factors and service requirements
or “workloads.” The cost factors reflect differences in average earnings, construction costs,
health care costs, other inter-provincial price differences and the percentage of the population
remote from metropolitan areas. The resulting price index for provincial and local government
services in 2008-09 is shown in Figure 15.
41 Kryvoruchko, Iryna Serhiyvna, “Redistributive Effectiveness of Three Equalization Alternatives: Representative Tax,
Macro-Based and Fiscal Needs Systems.  Evidence for Canada” (Working paper presented at the meeting of the
Canadian Economics Association, Hamilton, Ontario, May 27-29, 2005).
42 A.S. MacNevin, The Canadian Federal-Provincial Equalization Regime: An Assessment Canadian Tax Paper No.
109 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2004).  
43 Peter Gusen, “Expenditure Needs: Equalization’s Other Half,” Mowat Centre 46. (Toronto: Mowat Centre, School of
Public Policy and Governance, University of Toronto, 2012); and Peter Gusen, “Expenditure Needs: Equalization’s
Other Half” (Technical Background Paper, Mowat Centre, School of Public Policy and Governance, University of
Toronto, 2012).
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FIGURE 15 A PRICE INDEX FOR PROVINCIAL-LOCAL EXPENDITURES IN 2008-09
Source: Gusen (2012b, Chart 2, page 14).
The price index varies from around 1.1 in Alberta to 0.9 in P.E.I. At 1.03, Ontario’s cost index
is slightly above the national average, while the cost indices of all of the other recipient
provinces are below the national average.
Gusen’s expenditure needs components is based on demographics and expenditure levels in
five areas: health care, elementary and secondary education, post-secondary education, social
assistance and other social services. The per capita needs entitlements for 2008-09 are shown
in Figure 16 (a positive component implies an increase in equalization entitlements, while a
negative component implies a reduction).
FIGURE 16 PER CAPITA NEEDS ENTITLEMENTS IN 2008-09
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Because provinces with older populations have higher expenditure needs for health care, but
lower expenditure needs for education, the health and the two education categories are
offsetting in all provinces except Quebec and P.E.I. Probably the most controversial needs
component in the Gusen prototype is social assistance, which is a measure of the additional
income required to raise those with low incomes up to Statistics Canada’s low-income
thresholds. It could be argued that provinces with large low-income gaps will also have lower
fiscal capacity measures and higher equalization entitlements and, therefore, it is not necessary
to include the “need” for social assistance in the equalization formula. The equalization
entitlements derived from social assistance would increase total equalization entitlements for
the six recipient provinces by $661 million, while reducing the entitlements for P.E.I. and
Manitoba. The other needs components would reduce total equalization payments to the
recipient provinces. Overall, incorporating expenditure needs would reduce the equalization
entitlements of P.E.I. (-$617), Quebec (-$322) and New Brunswick ($-86). On the other hand,
it would increase the equalization entitlements of Ontario by ($67), Manitoba ($62) and Nova
Scotia ($31). The overall impact of the prototype needs based equalization entitlement in 2008-
09 (ignoring the three-year averaging of equalization entitlements) would have been to reduce
Quebec’s entitlement by $3.1 billion, P.E.I.’s by $86 million and Manitoba’s by $41 million,
while raising Ontario’s entitlement by $820 million, Nova Scotia’s by $294 million and New
Brunswick’s by $83 million. The total reduction in equalization entitlements from adopting the
prototype needs based equalization system would be $2 billion in 2008-09.44 Of course the
changes in the total amount of equalization, if the needs component were adopted, would also
depend on changes to other parameters of the equalization system, such as the resource revenue
inclusion rate and the ceiling on total equalization payments.
Gusen’s prototype demonstrates that it is feasible to construct needs entitlements with existing
data collected by Statistics Canada that would broadly correct for differences in the costs and
demographic characteristics across provinces. It would redistribute equalization payments
across provinces, with Quebec and P.E.I. losing entitlements and Ontario gaining a relatively
modest amount in per capita terms. At a minimum, Gusen’s analysis should place the
incorporation of needs high on the policy reform agenda.
Other Fiscal Reforms
The equalization program is sometimes referred to as the backbone of the Canadian federation.
Given its central role, it is not surprising that proposals to reform the equalization system often
encompass a wide range of other associated fiscal reforms. Some might argue that a large
package of reforms, which extends beyond the narrow definition of the equalization program,
is necessary to achieve an acceptable agreement for all regions. Here, we will briefly touch on
some of the wider fiscal reforms that have been associated with changes to the equalization
system.
44 Gusen, “Expenditure Needs: Equalization’s Other Half” (Technical Background Paper), 37 Table 39.
In view of the mismatch between federal funding of equalization and provincial resource
revenues that give rise to equalization entitlements, Boadway et al. and Courchene propose that
the federal government obtain a larger share of the economic rents generated by resource
industries by reforming the federal corporate income tax.45 Specifically, they propose that
Canada adopt an Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) base that would apply in all
industries. By providing a deduction for a return on shareholders’ equity as well as interest on
corporate debt, the ACE system removes the bias in favour of debt financing and converts the
corporate income tax into a tax on economic rents. Since much of the resource sector,
especially the oil and gas industry, generates most of the economic rent, this reform would tend
to shift the corporate tax burden from manufacturing and services sectors to the resource sector.
They also propose other changes to the corporate income tax system that would more directly
affect the resource sector, such as disallowing the deduction of provincial royalties from the
federal corporate income tax base or limiting the credits for oil and gas exploration and
development expenditures. It is the author’s view, however, that these reforms of the corporate
income tax should be evaluated on their overall merits, including their effects on corporate
investment incentives and international transfer pricing and should not be solely motivated by
an attempt to fix the equalization financing problem. 
Boadway et al. argue that the federal industrial policies should focus on strengthening the non-
resource-rich regions, with federal infrastructure grants acting as a counterbalance to “those
undertaken in resource-rich provinces.”46 Again, this emphasis on restructuring federal
infrastructure programs to address horizontal fiscal imbalances would alter the primary purpose
of these matching grants (i.e., to deal with the horizontal and vertical externalities that arise
from provincial and local infrastructure investments). Infrastructure projects in Calgary
generate additional personal, corporate and consumption tax revenues for the federal
government, just as infrastructure projects in Toronto do. The federal government should
provide matching grants for infrastructure projects for all provincial governments based on the
extent of their vertical and horizontal (i.e., interprovincial) benefit spillovers, both direct and
fiscal benefits, and not as an offset for the limitations of the equalization program.47
Linking other fiscal issues, such as Employment Insurance or a federal carbon tax, to the
reform of the equalization system has been proposed by Courchene.48 But these topics have
proven so contentious in the past, and are such important issues in their own right, that it
would probably be a mistake to try to bundle them with reforms to the equalization system
(especially if we want to see such reforms in our lifetime).
45 Boadway, Coulombe, and Tremblay, “Canadian Policy Prescriptions for Dutch Disease”; Mendelsohn, Back to
Basics; and Courchene, Surplus Recycling and the Canadian Federation.
46 Boadway, Coulombe, and Tremblay, “Canadian Policy Prescriptions for Dutch Disease,” 23. 
47 For a discussion on the design of matching infrastructure grants to deal with horizontal and vertical spillovers, see
Dahlby, “An Optimal Taxation Approach to Intergovernmental Grants.”
48 Courchene, Surplus Recycling and the Canadian Federation.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
In the interest of keeping a long paper from growing even longer, we will dispense with a
lengthy summary of the analysis and focus on a set of recommendations for the reform of the
fiscal transfer system that flow from the above analysis. Recommendations are divided into a
list of “dos” and “don’ts.”
DO
• Lower the resource revenue inclusion rate to 25%;
• Remove the ceiling on total equalization payments;
• Incorporate cost and needs factors along the lines of the Gusen report into the equalization
program;
• Combine the CHT and the CST into a single block transfer called the Canada Transfer; and
• Make the Canada Transfer an equal per capita transfer to all provinces with a fixed
schedule of increases linked to the GDP growth rate and re-examine its funding every five
years.
DON’T
• Exempt resource revenues deposited in provincial sovereign wealth funds;
• Claw-back the CHT and the CST based on the fiscal capacities of the province; and
• Carry out unrelated fiscal reforms in the name of equalization. 
This set of recommendations, while not addressing all of the concerns raised by the provinces
and the various commentators, would address at least some of the efficiency, entitlement and
ownership issues that constrain and shape any reforms to our fiscal transfer system.
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APPENDIX 1
Calculating the Marginal Cost of Public Funds from Federal Financing of Equalization Payments
We assume the tax changes are evaluated based on the following utilitarian social welfare
function:
SWF = ∑ piV (ti + T, gi, G)
i
where pi is the population of province i, V(.) is the indirect utility function of a representative
individual, ti is the provincial income tax rate, T is the federal income tax rate, and gi and G are
the provincial and federal public goods. Let Ri = ti yi be the provincial per capita income tax
revenue where yi is the income of the representative taxpayer in province i and R = T.y is the
federal per capita tax revenue where y is the national average income.
Differentiating the SWF with respect to T we obtain:
∂SWF 
= ∑ pi ∂V  + pi ∂V  ∂gi ∂Ri∂T ∂T           ∂gi ∂Ri ∂Ti
where the decline in provincial provision of public goods occurs because of the negative
vertical externality from the federal tax rate increase.
From Roy’s theorem and valuing the change in provincial at the provincial marginal cost of
public funds, MCFi, we obtain the following:
∂SWF 
= ∑–pi λi  yi [1 – MCFi ti hi]∂T
i
where ηi < 0 is the semi-elasticity of yi with respect to T and λi is the marginal utility of
income for the representative individual in province i. We assume that λi = 1 in all provinces
and define the marginal cost of federal tax rate increase as:
MCFT = – =  
where ηF < 0 is the semi-elasticity of the federal tax base with respect to a federal tax rate
increase. The above expression is used to calculate the cost of federal financing of changes in
the equalization grant system in Table 2 as the resource revenue inclusion rate changes.
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∂SWF
∂T
∑pi (yi) [1 – MCFi ti ηi ]
i y
∂R
∂T
1 + Ti ηF
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THE FREE RIDE IS OVER: WHY CITIES, AND CITIZENS, MUST START PAYING FOR MUCH-NEEDED INFRASTRUCTURE
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/bazelmintz-urban-growth.pdf
Philip Bazel and Jack Mintz | May 2014
ALBERTA CITIES AT THE CROSSROADS: URBAN DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/taylor-ab-cities-5.pdf
Anna Kramer, Marcy Burchfield and Zack Taylor | May 2014
ONTARIO’S EXPERIMENT WITH PRIMARY CARE REFORM
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/ontario-health-care-reform.pdf
Gioia Buckley and Arthur Sweetman | May 2014
THE MIDDLE POWER AND THE MIDDLE KINGDOM: SECURING CANADA’S PLACE IN THE NEW CHINA-U.S. ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC WORLD ORDER
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/dobson-china-communique.pdf
Wendy Dobson | April 2014
SAFETY IN NUMBERS: EVALUATING CANADIAN RAIL SAFETY DATA
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/winter-rail-safety-communique.pdf
Jennifer Winter | April 2014
CHINA’S STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AND CANADA’S FDI POLICY
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/dobson-china.pdf
Wendy Dobson | March 2014
